Adee Weller

Adee Weller

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Emory University. I study how criminal groups, militias, and other armed groups intersect with and shape politics.

Research

Working Papers

Please email me for the latest drafts.

“Defending the Status Quo? How Reelection Shapes Criminal Collusion in Mexico.”

Abstract How does the introduction of mayoral reelection shape organized crime's efforts to collude with local officials? While reelection can provide voters with a critical mechanism to hold elected officials accountable, I show that the positive benefits of reelection do not extend to high-crime areas. Where organized crime is powerful and deeply entrenched in local illicit economies, reelection can provide groups opportunities to collude more closely with mayors, engaging in more electoral violence to deter challengers and benefiting from access to state protection. Exploiting exogenous variation in the introduction of mayoral reelection in Mexico using a difference-in-differences design and a novel dataset on violence against local politicians, I show that criminal groups disproportionately killed rival candidates in places where incumbents could run for reelection, maintaining the status quo and keeping incumbents in power. Further, re-electable mayors were more likely be found to engage in corruption following the introduction of reelection, only in high-crime areas. This letter highlights the unintended consequences of institutional reforms in high-crime areas, emphasizing the need for tailored guardrails by policy-makers to reduce these collateral effects.
  • Keywords: reelection; institutional reform; organized crime; criminal violence; elections; Mexico

“Violence Incorporated? State Response to Pro-Government Militias in Northern Ireland”

  • Written with: Danielle Villa, Emily Gade, and Sarah Dreier
Abstract Why do states support some pro-government militias (PGMs) while actively sup- pressing others, particularly when the militias engage in similar behavior? This article examines the internal decision-making process of the British government during the conflict in Northern Ireland, analyzing 8,430 recently declassified documents from the Prime Ministers’ security-based Correspondence Files (1969-1974). These documents detail the British government’s internal attitudes and behaviors toward more than 20 Loyalist PGM groups. We show that the British government identified the benefits that certain PGMs could offer in terms of policing, auxiliary military support, and buttressing public opinion. The state was also deeply concerned about the long-term consequences of collusion, resulting in limited, short-term collaboration with certain beneficial PGMs. We provide the first internal account of how governments think about and work with PGMs, providing critical insights into how conflicts unfold in real-time, and contributing to a broader understanding of state-militia dynamics globally.
  • Keywords: Loyalist paramilitaries; UDA; UVF; collusion; pro-government militias; qualitative research; Northern Ireland

“Empires of Blood and Ruin: Colonial Repression and Criminal Actors in British India”

Abstract Why do states repress crime in some areas and allow it to flourish in others, even when crime itself has negative consequences on economies, human safety, and governing power? I suggest that authorities may selective provide--or withhold--repressive apparatuses to local agents as a mechanism of coalition management, rather than a strategy of solely preventing crime. By conditioning the receipt of security support on the loyalty of local intermediaries, authorities can reward loyal agents and coerce dissident ones into collaboration. This allows the central authority to manage their governing coalitions and expand power without formal institutional support. Using original archival data from the early years of English East India Company rule in Bengal (1769–1773), I show that the Company strategically repressed criminal actors to bolster the position of loyal agents while withholding security from those deemed disloyal, leveraging escalating disorder and fiscal crises to coerce compliance. Through a mixed-methods analysis of over 10,000 letters and meeting notes, the paper explores the causal processes underpinning these repressive tactics, demonstrating how the Company's governance strategy relied on managing elite coalitions rather than constructing bureaucratic institutions. This project highlights how states may utilize and exploit concerns about criminal violence under opposition rule as a tool of political gain in both historical and contemporary weak states. Further, these findings contribute to broader debates on political control in weak institutional settings, offering insights into the enduring role of selective repression in shaping governance under conditions of limited state capacity.
  • Keywords: East India Company; Historical Political Economy; archival research; crackdowns; armed resistence; Bengal

“How Resource Booms Shape Accountability: Liquefied Natural Gas in Cabo Delgado”

  • Written with: Gavin Kiger, Americo Maluana, William Wainwright, and Danielle Jung
Abstract How do natural resource booms shape political accountability? Rapid and sudden increases in extractive profits alter the relationship between voters, politicians, and corporate actors. This paper examines how oil and gas discoveries in Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin affect voter accountability and perceptions of the democratic process, highlighting the effects of corporate public goods provision. While politicians may divert resource rents to sustain patronage networks and entrench their power, corporations—bound by legal agreements—often take over the provision of essential public services. This dynamic distances politicians from the electorate, reducing voters’ ability to hold them accountable for public goods provision and eroding trust in democratic institutions. By outsourcing development to corporations, incumbents benefit from resource wealth without facing electoral consequences, leading to increased voter cynicism and disengagement. We exploit exogenous variation in oil discoveries across northern Mozambique to test our theory, replying on detailed data on perceptions of governmental actors and trust in officials. The findings will highlight the complex interplay between natural resources, corporate influence, and political accountability, offering new insights into the challenges resource-rich countries face in maintaining democratic governance.
  • Keywords: Resource booms; accountability; corporate governance; Mozambique; LNG

Works in Progress

“Managing An Extractive Empire: How the East India Company Solved Agency Problems”

Abstract To be hired by the English East India Company (EIC), an individual was generally required to be between fifteen and eighteen years old. With little training or local knowledge, employees were sent across the globe, supplied with arms, and instructed to maximize profits. As such, the EIC was plagued by agency problems from its inception. How do organizations solve this challenge? This is particularly acute in economically driven groups, where hiring a profit-seeking employee can both be highly beneficial but also highly risky. Examining the internal communications of the EIC as it shifted from a trading company to a governing authority, I show that the Company was deeply concerned about this issue. As a result, they formed an institutional structure of intelligence sharing and reporting on other's behavior, maximizing transparency and bureaucratizing spying. This project helps us understand how a group's organization shapes its behavior and responses to challenges.
  • Keywords: East India Company; Historical Political Economy; archival research; agency problems; organizational theory

“Arming the Armed: Explaining How Violent Groups Delegate Coercive Authority”

Abstract Violent armed groups around the world formally designate institutions, from specialized coercive institutions to ones that provide services. For groups that seek to reform, remove, or supplant the state, these institutions are a mechanism of direct governance by which the groups can impose a new political or social order. For groups that do not seek statehood, however, these institutions help them achieve their non-political goals, such as economic ones. However, because these groups do not rival the state, they can also co-opt state institutions and govern indirectly. This project examines the trade-off that non-state-seeking groups face when choosing an institutional arrangement. They can govern indirectly, through co-opting state institutions, or directly by developing their own institutions. Indirect governance establishes immediate access to state power but introduces principal-agent problems. When the state is unable to serve a faithful agent, groups may choose to form their own institutions. These can be more effective but also are much more costly to establish and maintain. I examine this conceptualization using qualitative evidence of coercive institutions by criminal groups in Mexico (1990-2010).
  • Keywords: criminal governance; institutions; non-state governance; order

“Divergent Accountability? Competing Principals and Incomplete Contracts”

Abstract How does the introduction of competing principals impact voters' ability to hold politicians accountable? This project builds off of canonical models of democratic accountability, which frame reelection as a chance for voters to solve the moral hazard problem they face with politicians. Here, however, there is a second principal who is also vying for control of the politician, as the agent, but who has fundamentally divergent goals from the voters. This principal also has a different set of skills that they can employ to coerce the official, using both bribes and threats. The politician, therefore, must appraise the risks they face and the value of holding office, given the incentives offered by each of the principals. This model has broad applications, applying wherever principals, armed with differing capacities, compete for control of an agent.
  • Keywords: multiple principals; accountability; moral hazard; delegation; organized crime; formal model

Data Collection

“Digitizing Private Correspondence from the East India Company (1769-1773)”

Abstract The English East India Company (EIC) has been called one of the most well-documented corporations in human history. In this qualitative dataset, I gather all recorded correspondence, internal and external, from the Company records kept at the Asia and Africa Reading Room at the British Library. I particularly focus on the Presidency of Bengal, where the EIC first obtained the rigth to extract land taxes and began to govern as an administrative body during this period. Thus, this period covers one of the most influential moments in Company history -- defining how British colonial policy in India would be organized for more than a century. With more than 4,000 pages of handwritten documents, the first goal of this project is to digitize these letters and clearly record their contents.
  • Keywords: Computer Vision; Natural Languange Processing; Predictive LLM; archival records

“Mapping Criminal Governance”

Abstract How do criminal groups govern? While our understanding of governance by criminal organizations has grown, there is little systematic data to map it. This project seeks to address this gap. Using newspaper articles from _The New York Times_ containing the names of more than 50 randomly selected groups from across Latin America, this project implements a supervised machine learning approach to code more than thirty indicators of criminal governance. This indicators include who is governing (what group or groups), how they are governing (enforcing rules, collecting taxes, distributing goods), and who they are governing (civilians, other criminals, or the state). This project seeks to expand our understanding of criminal governance across the globe.
  • Keywords: Criminal Governance; Latin America; Natural Language Processing; supervised machine learning